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Do Multinational Enterprises Relocate Employment to Low Wage Regions?  
 
Evidence from European Multinational 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the employment behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in Europe. 
To this end we use a unique firm level panel data set of more than 1,000 European multinational 
parent enterprises and their affiliates. The affiliates are located either in the European Union 
divided into (North, South), Central and Eastern Europe or both.  
We find that for parent firms operating in the manufacturing sector the elasticity of parent 
employment with respect to North EU affiliates’ labour costs is positive and statistically 
significant, ranging from 0.03 to 0.08, depending on the specification considered. This implies 
employment substitution between parents and their North EU based affiliates takes place in 
response to wage cost differentials between the parent and its North EU based affiliates. This 
substitution effect becomes stronger when affiliates are operating in a different sector than their 
parent firm. 
However, we find no evidence for such substitution effects between parent employment and 
its affiliates that are located in low wage regions in the EU and in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Furthermore, substitution effects are absent for parent firms operating in the non-manufacturing 
sector. 
Our results suggest that on average during the period of this study competition from low 
wage countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the South of the EU did not contribute to a 
relocation of domestic jobs to these low wage regions.  
 
JEL classification: F23, J23 
 
Key words: Relocation, Multinational Enterprises, Labour Demand 
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1. Introduction 
 
The opening up of Central and Eastern Europe posed a profound economic challenge for 
the European Union (EU). Virtually overnight EU countries were confronted with a group of 
neighboring countries with structurally very different economic conditions. The economic system 
of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) was built on nearly 50 years of centrally 
based planning. Even more importantly from the EU’s perspective was the huge gap in income, 
wages and productivity between the two regions. The demise of the Communist legacy 
represented an abrupt shock, especially when compared to the gradual process that characterizes 
post-war West European integration. Most of the policy concerns relate to employment, because 
Eastern Europe represents a large reservoir of low wage labour in the EU’s backyard.  
In light of the above, one concern is that low wage import competition from the CEECs 
may result in job losses in EU member states. Alternatively, EU companies may just move some 
of their operations to the CEEC. One of the most obvious channels through which home (EU) 
jobs may be affected by this increased economic integration is through the employment (re)-
allocation decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). It is often argued that MNEs are 
footloose (Caves, 1996; Görg and Strobl, 2002). They operate over a range of diverse national 
markets and can reallocate their factors of production across these markets to minimize total 
costs of production. The assumption is that they can respond to changing local economic 
conditions, without having to incur major set up costs.  
In this paper we study the effect of foreign wages on the demand for labour by EU 
MNEs1. We use firm level data of 1,067 medium and large sized parent MNEs matched with their 
2,078 affiliates located in the EU and/or Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, we can analyze 
how labour demand in parent and affiliate enterprises is associated with changes in affiliate 
wages relative to parent wages2. We define a parent as a firm located in country i holding a direct 
ownership share of at least 50% in one or more firms located in another country j and refer to 
these firms as affiliates. Thus we only consider this direct relationship and do not consider 
                                                 
1 Wages refer to total labour costs including social security contribution and payroll tax. 
2 A related literature is concerned with outsourcing by multinational firms in reducing demand for unskilled labour 
in the home country (e.g. Slaughter, 2000; Feenstra and Hanson, 1996). However, we have no information on the 
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indirect holding structures. The fact that we have a panel of matched parent firms with their 
affiliates allows us to control for firm specific technology that may affect labour allocation across 
different regions. This enables us to focus on the employment substitution effects between parent 
firms (or home parent employment) and their affiliates. Substitution effects may exist in response 
to changing wage conditions in different countries, while at the same time keeping constant 
global output that the MNE seeks to produce. 
The data that we use in this paper offer a number of advantages relative to earlier studies. 
First, in contrast to earlier studies, this paper uses a large firm level panel data set of medium and 
large sized MNEs with parents located in various EU countries. Second, our data includes both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing parent firms and their affiliates. This allows us to make a 
distinction between MNEs with affiliates operating in the same sector or different sectors 
compared to their parents, which may shed some light on the strategies that MNEs are pursuing. 
A third advantage of the current work and data is that we are able to differentiate on the basis of 
wage costs across the European regions.  In our analysis we can distinguish between ‘very low’ 
wage locations (CEEC), ‘low’ wage locations (South EU) and ‘high’ wage locations (North EU). 
This allows us to assert whether low wage competition may potentially be important for 
‘footloose’ multinationals, enabling them to reshuffle expensive jobs to cheaper ones in the low 
wage locations within and outside the EU.  
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:  
(i) We find supporting evidence for employment relocation effects between parent home 
employment and affiliate foreign employment. This relocation effect depends on the activity in 
which the parent MNE is operating.  
(ii) For MNE parent firms operating in the manufacturing sector we find that, contrary to the 
popular belief, employment relocation occurs mainly between home parent firms and their North-
EU based affiliates. Employment relocation does not occur on average from parent firms to either 
South-EU or Central and East European based affiliates.  
(iii) Additionally, we find that the substitution effects are stronger when the sector of activity 
of the parent firm is different than the sector of activity of the affiliates.  
                                                                                                                                                              
skill composition of the workers in our firm level data, so we are not able to focus on these type of demand shifts. 
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(iv) In contrast, for parent firms operating in the non-manufacturing sector we find no 
evidence of relocation effects.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section the literature is reviewed and 
section 3 describes the data that is used. Section 4 sets up the econometric framework and reports 
the main results. Section 5 reports some robustness checks, while section 6 gives the conclusion. 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This paper is not about the actual investment decision and its impact on employment in 
MNEs. Rather, we take locations as given3. What we do consider is how MNEs reshuffle jobs 
between the parent and their affiliates in response to wage differentials that may exist between 
these operations. Our data do not provide any information on the actual timing of the investment 
decision, so we cannot evaluate the effects on employment in response to the actual 
investment/location decision. Of course, relative wage costs in various countries may play a role 
in the location decision of a MNE, which may have implications for employment responses.  
However, strategic reasons related to market penetration and market expansion are often 
found as the main driving forces for foreign direct investment, rather than labour cost 
differentials (e.g. Lankes and Venables, 1996, Abraham and Konings, 1999). Braconier and 
Ekholm (2001) investigate whether the actual location decision of Swedish MNE affiliates 
matters in estimating employment responses within the MNE. While they find that relative wage 
costs matter in explaining location patterns of Swedish affiliates, they find no evidence that 
sample selection matters in explaining parent employment responses to wage cost changes in 
their affiliates. 
It is only recently that matched parent-affiliate data sets have become available and have 
been used to address similar questions. Brainard and Riker (1997) use firm level data of US 
MNEs in the 1980s, but find very low substitution effects between home parent employment and 
their foreign affiliates. In contrast, Blomström, Fors and Lipsey (1997) also using firm level data 
on US and Swedish MNEs find evidence that US parent firms have allocated some of their more 
                                                 
3We focus on how relative wages may affect employment decisions of the MNE once locations are fixed. Our results 
can be interpreted as the short-run effects of wage differentials on the employment allocation decision of MNEs. 
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labour-intensive operations to affiliates in developing countries.  In addition, they find no 
evidence that Swedish MNEs relocate employment between the parent and its low-wage foreign 
affiliates. Likewise, Bruno and Falzoni (2000) find strong employment relocation effects between 
US parent firms and their affiliates in developing countries. Interestingly, Hatzius (1998) and 
Braconier and Ekholm (2000) use Swedish firm level panel data, collected through surveys, and 
find that employment relocation is taking place between the Swedish headquarters and their 
affiliates in other high-income locations.  
While this paper is not directly testing various theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
it is worth mentioning - as a background - the distinction that is made in the literature between 
horizontal and vertical FDI because this is also related to labour cost differentials in different 
locations. The vertical FDI viewpoint is that the MNE locates in a particular place to take 
advantage of international factor-price differences (e.g. Feenstra and Hanson, 1996). Parent 
headquarters engage in more capital-intensive activities, while production is labour intensive and 
is outsourced to the low-wage locations.  
The horizontal FDI view asserts that MNE investment arises because trade barriers 
increase the costs of exporting. FDI in this view takes place primarily for market expansion 
reasons (e.g. Markusen, 1995; Markusen and Venables, 1998, 2000). Empirical work has 
provided evidence supporting the horizontal view of FDI, assisted by the fact that a significant 
proportion of FDI flowed between rich countries (e.g. Markusen, 1995, Lipsey, 1999, Carr, 
Markusen and Maskus, 2001).  
More recent empirical work by Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2001) emphasizes the 
significant role of outsourcing and conclude that both horizontal and vertical strategies in MNE 
decisions are important. They use matched US parent-affiliate data taken from the US Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and document a striking difference in MNE strategies in the 1980s versus the 
1990s4. In the 1980s a rising concentration of affiliate activities in high-income countries took 
place, with relatively stable employment in US affiliates, however, this changed in the 1990s. By 
1999 the OECD employment share had fallen below its 1982 level, with the non-OECD share up 
to 35.7%. US affiliates in low-income countries experienced rapid annual employment growth 
                                                 
4 They exploit micro data on US headquartered MNEs and their affiliates during in the 1980s and 1990s. 
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rates in the 1990s, especially in the emerging market economies of the CEECs and China. 
3. Data and Preliminary Facts 
 
We make use of a commercial database of company accounts, comparable to other 
company account data sets such as the Compustat database in the US or the Exstat database in the 
UK. The data is commercialized under the name “Amadeus” by Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) and has 
been used in recent years to analyze various economic issues in a growing number of academic 
papers5. Amadeus data includes information from the Balance Sheets and Income and Loss 
Statements of medium and large sized companies in the EU and in Central and Eastern Europe 
(see also data appendix). In most European countries medium and large sized enterprises are 
required by law to submit company accounts to their Central Bank or National Statistical Offices. 
All these company accounts went through a formal external auditing process, so we have no 
reasons to believe that the reported information in the Balance Sheet and Income and Loss 
Statement is incorrect.  
Apart from the standard data provided in company accounts, the data also includes 
information on the ownership structure of firms. The company records include information on 
whether the company has an ownership stake in a foreign affiliate, and identify affiliates by name 
and an identification number. For some countries (e.g. Belgium) companies are required by law 
to report their affiliates, while for some other countries (e.g. the Netherlands) companies can 
voluntarily choose whether or not to report their affiliates.   
 Financial and operational information is available for 1993 through 1998, and we 
retrieved all companies for which unconsolidated accounts were available separately for the 
parent and its affiliates.  Due to variation in national reporting requirements, all companies in 
some countries—in particular Greece and Finland—lack basic information (e.g., wage bills) that 
are essential for our analysis. Otherwise, we include companies in the data set simply on the basis 
of data availability and the ability to link parents with foreign affiliates.  Companies in all 
industries are included, with primary industry for each parent and affiliate reported at the two-
                                                 
5 Budina et al (2000) investigate liquidity constraints in Bulgarian firms, Konings et al. (2001) study price-cost 
margins in Belgian and Dutch firms, Budd et al (2002) analyze international rent-sharing in European multinational 
firms, Checchi et al (2003) investigate how labour demand adjusts in foreign versus domestic European firms. 
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digit level of the NACE system. 
The available ownership information refers to the year 1998, and we assume that the 
parent-affiliate ownership structure for 1998 applies to the earlier years.  While we cannot trace 
ownership changes during the sample period, we do not believe that this is a serious problem.  To 
the extent that we are potentially including a few affiliates who were not affiliated in earlier 
years, we are introducing measurement error that may bias our results towards zero. 
Our eventual data set covers the period 1993-98 and is an unbalanced panel of 1,067 
parent companies located in the EU, with 2,078 affiliates located in the EU or Central and 
Eastern Europe or both6. We only take into account direct ownership links and furthermore there 
is no affiliate that also appears as a parent in our data set7. Tables 1 and 2 show the distribution of 
parent firms and their affiliates across the various European countries. Germany, France and 
Belgium host almost 60% of the parent firms in our sample. France, Italy, Spain and the UK 
contain many of the affiliates in our sample, with only 5.34% located in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
Table 3 shows the distribution of parent-affiliates across the two broad classes of sectors, 
manufacturing versus non-manufacturing. In our sample nearly half (48%) of manufacturing 
parent firms have affiliates solely in the manufacturing sector. Almost one third (32.19%) of 
manufacturing parents have affiliates in non-manufacturing only, while 19.72% have affiliates 
both in manufacturing and non-manufacturing. Typically, manufacturing parent firms in these 
last two categories have over 80% of their affiliates in the wholesale and retail distribution 
sectors. It is therefore unlikely, for this category of firms, that reallocation of employment in 
response to wage cost differentials is important. This is because the main activity of the foreign 
affiliate is related to distribution rather than production within the multinational group.  
Turning to the non-manufacturing parent firms we note that 58.47% of them control affiliates 
only in the non-manufacturing sectors, with a substantial fraction (24.66%) having affiliates in 
manufacturing only. This latter fraction could reflect that the production is ‘outsourced’ to the 
affiliates, while the ‘administration’ is done in the home parent firm. Our analysis will exploit 
                                                 
6 Amadeus does not report financial information on companies that are located in the US, Africa, Asia, so our 
analysis is restricted to Europe. Given that wage cost differentials are already substantial within Europe we believe 
we are already picking up some basic patterns, which would persist if we included more low wage regions.  
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some of these dimensions. 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the evolution of total affiliate employment as a fraction of total MNE 
employment, i.e. the sum of total affiliate and parent employment. Figure 1 shows us that the 
employment share of parent MNEs has declined from 85% to 72% between 1993 and 1998, while 
the employment share of its affiliates has steadily increased from 15% to 28% in this period. This 
suggests that some reshuffling of jobs between parent firms and their affiliates took place in this 
relatively short time period. Figures 2 and 3 shed some more light on this reshuffling. Looking at 
figure 2 we note that it is especially the affiliates located in the EU that have gained in relative 
employment, while the employment shares of the affiliates in CEEC remained relatively stable.  
Finally, figure 3 makes an additional distinction between affiliates located in ‘South’ Europe 
and ‘North’ Europe. We defined the ‘South’ of Europe as the low wage countries in the EU, i.e. 
Spain, Italy, Portugal and Ireland8. We can see that the increased fraction of affiliate EU 
employment is mainly driven by an increased fraction of employment in affiliates located in the 
‘North’ of Europe. These patterns suggest that most of the job relocation took place between EU 
parent firms and their affiliates located in the ‘North’ of Europe. We will test this hypothesis in a 
more rigorous framework in section 4. 
Table 4 shows summary statistics on the data that we are using. We proxy output by the total 
value added of the MNE using a weighted sum of the value added of the parent and of its 
affiliates. As we can see from table 4, parent companies in our sample employ on average 1,873 
persons, while their affiliates employ less workers on average. The typical EU affiliate employs 
243 workers on average, while the typical affiliate in CEEC employs almost twice as many 
workers, 460.  
This is not surprising since unit labour costs are much lower in the latter region. The average 
labour cost per worker per year is $ 52,000 in parent firms, while this is only $7,000 in the 
typical affiliate in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the labour cost in Central and Eastern 
Europe is much lower than in Europe, the average labour productivity is also much lower. In our 
sample value added per worker in the ‘North’ EU is $83,000 and is $81,000 in the ‘South’ EU, 
but only $22,000 in the Central and Eastern Europe region on average. 
                                                                                                                                                              
7 Information on indirect ownership structures was often lacking from the data. 
8 Ireland was a low wage region in the period of this study. 
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4. Econometric Framework and Results 
 
4.1 Econometric Specification 
 
Consider a MNE that produces global output, Y, using the following production function, 
which depends only on labour input in the various locations.  
 
Y =  F(LP, LANEU,LASEU, LACEEC)    (1) 
 
Where: 
Y = Total output of the multinational (i.e.: the sum of output in the parent and all its affiliates), F 
is the production function, LP  = Parent employment, LAl = Affiliate employment in location l (l = 
NEU, i.e. North EU, SEU, i.e. South EU, CEEC).  
 
Total cost minimization under constraint (1) yields us the conditional demand for parent 
employment: 
 
LP = hP(WP,WANEU,WASEU, WACEEC, Y)   (2) 
             -        +            +       +       +        
Where WP stands for the parent wage cost per worker, WAl stands for the wage cost per worker of 
the affiliate located in l (l = NEU, SEU, CEEC).  
 
We expect the following partial derivatives: 
• The own wage to be negatively related to parent labour demand; 
δhP/δWP < 0. 
• If there are substitution effects between parent and affiliate employment; 
δhP/δWAl > 0, with l = NEU, SEU, CEEC. 
• If there are no substitution effects between parent and affiliate employment;  
δhP/δWAl ≤ 0, with l = NEU, SEU, CEEC. 
The substitution effect or employment relocation effect gives an indication of the 
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technological substitution possibilities between parent and affiliate employment, for a given 
production of a global output level. It represents the technological possibilities to move along the 
same isoquant. Equation (2) will form the basis of our empirical specifications. In particular we 
will estimate (2) by assuming a log-linear approximation or  
 
ln LitP=αiP + α1lnWitP+α2lnWiNEUtA+α3lnWiSEUtA+α4lnWiCEECtA+ α5lnYit+εit   (3) 
 
With i = firm i, t = year, εit = white noise. 
We include αiP, which is a firm specific fixed effect that is not observable. This may 
include distance between the parent and affiliate company, in general it refers to unobserved 
heterogeneity. To take into account that not all parent firms have affiliates in all locations (NEU, 
SEU, CEEC) we will estimate equation (3) including location dummies9. Furthermore we include 
in (3) year dummies to control for unobserved aggregate shocks, which are common to all parent 
firms. The above framework does not take into account potential employment adjustment costs in 
response to shocks, which would imply a dynamic specification.  
To theoretically model adjustment costs for multinational enterprises is not 
straightforward as these costs may be different for the parent company and its affiliates, 
depending on the local institutional constraints. Studies that assume symmetric quadratic costs of 
adjustment suggest that the speed of adjustment varies in different countries. Hamermesh and 
Pfann (1996) suggest the assumption of symmetric quadratic adjustment costs is one of the 
reasons to find differences in the speed of adjustment and suggest some alternatives10.  
It is not our purpose to model such an adjustment process for the allocation decision of 
employment for MNEs. Information on the opening and closing of affiliates is likely to be 
important for this, however this is not given in our data.  Instead we will conduct a number of 
                                                 
9 Technically the firm level fixed effects control for these location dummies as they are perfectly collinear with the 
firm level fixed effect. 
10Anderson (1993) finds for US retail establishments that most of the adjustment is completed in one quarter. 
Mairesse and Dormont (1985) find for American manufacturing firms nearly five-sixths of the response is completed 
within a year, while for French and German manufacturing firms they find a very slow adjustment. Nickell and 
Wadhwani (1991) find for UK manufacturing firms that only 20% of the adjustment to a shock is made up in one 
year.   
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robustness checks by estimating a simple dynamic employment equation, without deriving this 
theoretically. 
 
4.2 Results 
 
 Table 5 shows firm level fixed effects estimates for equation (3). Column (1) gives the 
results for the overall sample, while columns (2) and (3) for parent firms operating in the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing respectively. The first point worth noting is that the own 
wage elasticity (i.e. the effect of WP) is estimated at –0.89, this is well within the range of 
estimated labour demand elasticities reported in the literature (e.g. Hamermesh, 1993). The 
substitution elasticities give an indication about the responsiveness of parent employment to 
wage changes in affiliates. These elasticities are given by the coefficients that are associated with 
WNEU, WSEU, WCEEC, reflecting the effect of wage changes in affiliates located in Northern 
Europe, Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe respectively. All three are estimated 
positively, however, only the wage effect on parent employment of affiliates located in Northern 
Europe is estimated positive and statistically significant, with a coefficient of 0.018. This 
suggests that a reduction of say 10% in affiliate wages located in the North European countries is 
associated with a reduction in home (parent) employment of 0.18% on average.   
In contrast, we find no statistically significant effect of a reduction in wages of affiliates 
located in the South of the EU and in Central and Eastern Europe. This suggests that employment 
substitution or relocation in response to relative wage changes only takes place between parent 
firms (which are mainly located in the North of the EU) and their affiliates that are also located in 
the North of the EU. This result comes as a bit of a surprise and suggests that competition from 
low wage locations (on average) does not constitute a threat to parent employment. Braconier and 
Ekholm (2000) report similar results for Swedish MNEs.  
One potential explanation for this finding is the proximity hypothesis put forward by 
Brainard (1997). Brainard shows that it is more likely that substitution between parent and 
affiliate employment takes place in response to wage cost differentials when the proximity to the 
final market is important. In this case transport or trade costs are assumed to be negligible. Such 
substitution effects are also more likely when the initial factor endowments are similar across 
11
 
locations. This is the case for North European affiliate and (mostly North EU based) parent firms 
in our sample. 
 In the second and third column of table 5 we report results for the sub-samples of parent 
companies operating in the manufacturing versus the non-manufacturing sector. We can see that 
the relocation effect, estimated by the coefficient on WNEU , is driven mainly by the sub-sample of 
parent firms operating in the manufacturing sector. From column (2) we note that this estimated 
effect is now twice as high, at 0.032, compared to the estimate based on the whole sample in 
column (1). Moreover, we find no statistically significant substitution elasticities for our sub-
sample of parent firms operating in the non-manufacturing sector as shown in column (3). One 
potential reason why we find no substitution effects in the non-manufacturing sector could be due 
to the nature of these activities, in that it is believed that there are more non-tradables in non-
manufacturing.  
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 
 In table 6 we report some robustness checks. As discussed earlier it is well known that 
adjustment costs in employment are potentially important, which may imply a dynamic 
employment specification. In table 6 we report a simple dynamic model in which we include the 
lagged dependent variable. The introduction of a lagged dependent variable in a fixed effects 
model introduces an endogeneity bias. We therefore estimated this model in first differences to 
control for the unobserved firm level fixed effects and applied the Arellano and Bond (1991) IV 
GMM estimator. This means that we used all available moment restrictions on employment dated 
from t-2 and before. Furthermore, we instrument output using all available moment restrictions 
from t-2 and before. Additional instruments included parent country dummies, which may 
capture institutional differences such as minimum wage laws, employment protection legislation, 
etc. between countries.  
These exercises suggest that our basic results remain robust. The Sargan test (Chi-2 
distribution) and the second order serial correlation test (Normal distribution) suggest that the 
instruments and model specification are valid. We find that the parent short and long run own-
wage elasticity is estimated at -0.65 and –1.0 respectively, while the short and long run 
12
 
substitution elasticity between parent employment and North EU affiliate employment is 
estimated 0.03 and 0.05 respectively. Thus, as before, employment relocation seems to take 
place, but only between North EU parent employment and North EU affiliate employment. 
Again, this result is driven by the substitution possibilities in the manufacturing sector, where 
estimated short and long run elasticity of substitution is 0.06 and 0.08 respectively.  
One of the empirical regularities characterizing MNEs is that they mostly operate in 
sectors that are R&D intensive. They are often characterized by high levels of intangible assets, 
which is often reflected in the skill composition of their workforce (Markusen, 1995). The data 
that we use have no information on the skill composition of the workforce, so we treated labour 
as homogeneous. Slaughter (2000) has shown for the US that this may not be too much of a 
problem. He finds that MNE transfer to low wage countries has occurred, however, he finds no 
evidence that this has contributed to shifts in the relative demand for fewer unskilled workers in 
the US. As an extra robustness check we include extra controls in our equation as proxies for 
R&D intensity at the parent firm. To proxy for R&D intensity we use intangible assets as a 
percentage of total assets in the parent firm. A second control variable that we include is capital, 
proxied by the book value of tangible fixed assets. Our results, reported in table A1 of the 
appendix, remained robust to the inclusion of these extra controls. 
 The previous results did not make any distinction between affiliates that are operating in 
the same sector as their parent versus affiliates that are operating in a different sector from their 
parents. However, many of the affiliates of manufacturing parents are operating in the wholesale 
and retail trade sector. Arguably, these affiliates have as their main function selling and 
distribution activities aimed at market expansion. In these cases it seems unlikely that 
employment substitution based on labour cost differentials takes place. In table 7 we report fixed 
effects estimates of manufacturing parents with affiliates operating in the same 2-digit sector, 
affiliates operating in a different 2-digit sector. Finally, in column 3, affiliates operating in a 
different 2-digit sector, but excluding the wholesale and trade sectors. We find that employment 
substitution between parents and their affiliates takes place, but only if they are operating in a 
different sector. Moreover, the substitution elasticity increases when we exclude the wholesale 
and retail trade sectors and is equal to 0.08 (column 3). This suggests that a reduction in labour 
costs in the North EU affiliates of 10% is associated with a reduction in home (parent) 
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employment of about 1%, which is quite substantial.  These results hold up if we consider a 
dynamic specification and use instrumental variables, not reported here for brevity.  
 A final experiment, reported in the appendix table A2, considers employment equations of 
affiliates in the various regions. Again our main result is confirmed. There is only evidence of 
substitution effects between North EU affiliate employment and parent employment. 
Furthermore, table A2 shows also that there is no substitution taking place between the different 
affiliates. In contrast, we find that for affiliates located in the South EU, the wage cost of CEEC 
affiliates of the same MNE have a negative effect on South EU employment, which suggests that 
CEEC employment and South EU employment are complements.  
In summary, our results indicate that competition from low wage locations does not 
contribute significantly to employment relocation from home (parent) firms to their affiliates in 
these low wage locations. Since we have no information on the actual opening up of affiliates we 
could not investigate whether the actual investment is associated with job loss and therefore the 
results in this paper need to be interpreted as short run employment relocation between parents 
and their affiliates.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper used a large representative panel data set of more than 1000 EU MNEs and 
their affiliates located in the EU and CEEC. We tested whether parent MNE jobs are substituted 
for foreign affiliate jobs. We find evidence supporting the presence of substitution effects 
between parent employment and foreign employment. However, contrary to the popular belief we 
find that employment relocation mainly takes place between (mainly Northern EU based) parent 
companies and their affiliates located also in the North of the EU, rather than their affiliates 
located in the South EU and CEECs. Furthermore, this effect is mainly present in the 
manufacturing sector. The substitution effects are amplified in affiliates that are operating in a 
different sector than their parent. 
For parent firms operating in the manufacturing sector we find employment substitution 
elasticities ranging between 0.03 and 1.0. This potentially can cause large flows of employment if 
labour costs in different regions change, perhaps due to institutional changes affecting labour 
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costs, such as changes in employer contributions. Our findings on wage cost differentials and 
employment substitution are consistent with the proximity hypothesis. This suggests that, 
substitution takes place when the proximity to the final market is important and when initial 
factor endowments are similar across locations.  
The results in this paper suggest that on average the opening of CEEC should not be viewed 
as a threat to European employment. It is rather competition between EU countries that lead 
multinational parent firms to relocate employment between EU locations. This paper has not, 
however, investigated the employment impact of the actual investment/location decision of 
MNEs due to data limitations. Further research on this latter issue seems to be important to assess 
the full impact of the increased global nature of firms. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of all Parent and all Affiliate Employment in Total Employment of all 
MNEs (Parents and Affiliates) 
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Figure 2: Evolution of all EU and CEEC Affiliate Employment in Total Employment of all 
MNE (Parents and Affiliates) 
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Figure 3: Evolution of all EU, South EU, North EU and CEEC Affiliate Employment in Total 
Employment of all MNE (Parents and Affiliates) 
 
evolution of affiliate employment shares in total employment of MNEs
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 fraction EU employment  fraction South EU employment
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Table 1: Distribution of Parent Firms across the EU 
 
Parent Country Frequency of Firms 
Austria 2.08% 
Belgium 13.54% 
Denmark 3.65% 
Ireland 0.22% 
France 27.16% 
Germany 20.83% 
Italy 14.14% 
Luxemburg 0.30% 
Netherlands 2.23% 
Portugal 0.15% 
Spain 5.36% 
UK 10.34% 
 
Table 2:Distribution of Affiliates across Countries 
 
Affiliate Country Frequency of Firms 
Central and Eastern Europe 5.34% 
Austria 1.89% 
Belgium 8.45% 
Denmark 0.68% 
France 22.62% 
Germany 2.27% 
Netherlands 2.12% 
Ireland 0.89% 
Italy 11.37% 
Luxemburg 0.83% 
Portugal 3.18% 
Spain 20.58% 
Sweden 3.83% 
UK 15.95% 
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Table 3: Sector Distribution of Parents and Affiliates: 
 
 
   AFFILIATE  
  Manufacturing Non-Manufacturing Both 
PARENT Manufacturing 48.09% 32.19% 19.72% 
 Non-Manufacturing 24.66% 58.47% 16.87% 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 Mean Standard error 
Parent employment 1873 4444 
Affiliate employment 
Of which: 
In the EU 
In CEEC 
In ‘South’ EU 
In ‘North’ EU 
257 
 
243 
460 
225 
252 
409 
 
390 
577 
354 
407 
Parent wage cost per worker 52 18.38 
Affiliate wage cost per worker 
Of which: 
In the EU 
In CEEC 
In ‘South’ EU 
In ‘North’ EU 
 
 
45 
7 
41 
47 
 
 
17 
7 
15 
17 
Parent Value added per worker 104 79 
Affiliate value added per worker 
Of which 
In the EU 
In CEEC 
In ‘South’ EU 
In ‘North’ EU 
 
 
82.3 
22 
81 
83 
 
 
71 
36 
62 
76 
Number of affiliates 1.65 2.44 
 
Note: (i) Wage costs and value added in terms of 1000 US Dollars. 
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Table 5: Parent Employment and Wages in Northern, Southern and Eastern Europe 
Fixed Effects Estimates 
 (1) 
Whole sample 
 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Non-manufacturing 
    
WP -0.89*** -1.03*** -0.69*** 
 (0.032) (0.041) (0.050) 
WANEU 0.018** 0.032** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.011) (0.017) 
WASEU 0.002 0.009 -0.013 
 (0.01) (0.012) (0.02) 
WACEEC 0.024 0.015 0.04 
 (0.021) (0.028) (0.03) 
Y 0.48** 0.57*** 0.33*** 
 (0.015) (0.02) (0.024) 
Number of 
observations 
4375 2817 1558 
R2 within 0.35 0.42 0.26 
R2 between 0.62 0.64 0.59 
R2 overall 0.69 0.72 0.64 
 
Notes:  (i) All equations include year dummies. 
(ii) ***1%, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance. 
  (iii) Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 6: Parent Employment and Wages in Northern EU, Southern EU and, 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Arellano and Bond GMM IV Estimates 
 (1) 
Whole 
sample 
 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Non-manufacturing 
LPt-1 0.40*** 0.20*** 0.46*** 
 (0.05) (0.067) (0.10) 
WP -0.65*** -0.82*** -0.57*** 
 (0.11) (0.15) (0.11) 
WANEU 0.03* 0.06*** 0.022 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.016) 
WASEU 0.015 0.03 -0.017 
 (0.015) (0.02) (0.014) 
WACEEC 0.012 -0.01 0.038* 
 (0.016) (0.02) (0.022) 
Y 0.57*** 0.72*** 0.33*** 
 (0.086) (0.11) (0.10) 
Number of observations 1576 1090 485 
Sargan test (Prob>Chi2) 0.74 0.54 0.99 
Test of Second Order Serial 
Correlation (z-value) 
-0.22 0.17 0.93 
 
Notes:  (i) All equations include year dummies.  
(ii) ***1%, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance.  
(iii) Robust one step standard errors in brackets.  
(iv) The lagged dependent variable and total output are instrumented using all 
available moment restrictions. Parent country dummies are included as 
additional instruments. 
 
 
 
 
 23
 
Table 7: Parent Employment and Wages in Affiliates Operating in the same 2-digit 
Sector Versus Affiliates Operating in Different 2-digit Sectors as their Parents 
 
Manufacturing Parents 
 
 Same Sector 
 
Different Sector 
 
Different Sector, 
excluding wholesale 
and retail trade 
WP -1.02*** 
(0.07) 
-0.99*** 
(0.05) 
-1.5** 
(0.09) 
WANEU -0.03 
(0.05) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.08** 
(0.02) 
WASEU 0.06 
(0.06) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
-0.007 
(0.02) 
WACEEC -0.02 
(0.09) 
0.014 
(0.03) 
0.022 
(0.03) 
Y 0.68*** 
(0.05) 
0.57*** 
(0.02) 
0.60** 
(0.03) 
Number of 
observations 
682 1934 1166 
R2 within 0.50 0.43 0.47 
R2 between 0.59 0.66 0.43 
R2 overall 0.67 0.74 0.60 
 
Notes:  (i) All equations include year dummies. 
(ii) ***1%, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance. 
  (iii) Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Appendix  
 
The Database 
 
Our basic data source is a commercial one, marketed by Bureau Van Dijck 
(BvD) and consists of published annual accounts of medium and large sized European 
firms, covering the years 1993-98. Firms in the data set have to satisfy at least one of 
the following criteria: number of employees greater than 100, total assets and 
operating revenue exceeding 16 million and 8 million USD respectively. The 
coverage of the data varies between countries, depending on the local accounting 
legislation. All in all the data for these medium and large sized enterprises are fairly 
representative for the manufacturing sector. For the non-manufacturing sector the 
coverage is somewhat weaker as the average firm size is typically smaller in the non-
manufacturing sector.  
Detailed information on the ownership linkages of firms is provided and BvD 
aims at providing as accurately as possible the information on foreign ownership 
holdings. For some countries in the data this is straightforward as by law companies 
have to report their foreign held affiliates (e.g. in Belgium and France). For some 
other countries this is not required by the law, but BvD directly contacts the 
companies and consults the annual company reports to retrieve the ownership 
information. For the companies that report foreign owned affiliates the identification 
number of these affiliates in Amadeus is provided, which allowed us to retrieve the 
annual accounts of the affiliates and match them up with the annual accounts of the 
parents. However, only affiliates that are located in Europe or Central and Eastern 
Europe are provided in Amadeus, which does not allow us to investigate the behavior 
of affiliates in other regions in the world like Africa, Asia, etc..  
 
 25
Definition of the Variables 
 
Since some MNEs have more than one affiliate we constructed the average 
values of the variables of interest taken over all subsidiaries in Europe and the 
average values of the variables of interest taken over all affiliates in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 
Total output of the MNE (Y): the weighted sum of value added in the parent company 
and the value added of its affiliates, where the weight represent the importance of 
value added in total value added for the parent versus the affiliates. 
 
Unit wage cost of the parent (WP): total wage bill of the parent company divided by 
total employment of the parent company. 
 
Unit wage cost of the qffiliates in the South of the EU (WASEU): the average total wage 
bill of all South EU based affiliates of that particular MNE divided by the average 
total employment of all South EU affiliates of that particular MNE. 
 
Unit wage cost of the qffiliates in the North of the EU (WANEU): the average total 
wage bill of all North EU based affiliates of that particular MNE divided by the 
average total employment of all North EU affiliates of that particular MNE. 
 
Unit wage cost of the affiliates in CEEC (WACEEC): the average total wage bill of all 
CEEC affiliates of that particular MNE divided by the average total employment of 
all CEEC affiliates of that particular MNE. 
 
R&D intensity: intangible assets as a percentage of total assets in the parent firm. 
 
Capital: the book value of tangible fixed assets. 
 
Central and East European Countries (CEECs): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic (Note that data for Hungary are not available from 
Amadeus). 
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North European Union Countries (‘North’ EU): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands and United Kingdom. 
 
South European Union Countries (‘South’ EU): Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
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Table A1: Parent Employment and Wages in Northern, Southern and Eastern 
Europe 
Fixed Effects Estimates 
 (1) 
Whole sample 
 
(2) 
Manufacturing 
(3) 
Non-manufacturing 
    
WP -0.87*** -1.01*** -0.65*** 
 (0.032) (0.04) (0.05) 
WANEU 0.04*** 0.06*** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.012) (0.02) 
WASEU -0.005 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
WACEEC -0.009 -0.009 0.009 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Y 0.31*** 0.39*** 0.19*** 
 (0.016) (0.02) (0.03) 
R&D 0.54** 0.30 0.37 
 (0.26) (0.30) (0.53) 
Capital 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.36** 
 (0.011) (0.01) (0.02) 
Number of 
observations 
3204 2025 1179 
R2 within 0.59 0.65 0.50 
R2 between 0.73 0.72 0.69 
R2 overall 0.77 0.78 0.72 
 
Notes:  (i) All equations include year dummies. 
(ii)  ***1%, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance. 
  (iii) Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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Table A2: Employment Regressions of Affiliates  
 
 North EU South EU CEEC 
WSEU 0.006 
(0.01) 
-0.35*** 
(0.05) 
-0.021 
(0.044) 
WNEU -0.29*** 
(0.04) 
-0.004 
(0.02) 
-0.013 
(0.05) 
WCEEC 0.008 
(0.04) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
WP 0.09* 
(0.05) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
0.05 
(0.35) 
Y 0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.018 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
Number of 
observations 
1821 1186 258 
R2 within 0.07 0.13 0.04 
R2 between 0.08 0.03 0.006 
R2 overall 0.09 0.03 0.001 
 
Notes:  (i) All equations include year dummies. 
(ii) ***1%, ** 5% significance and * 10% significance. 
  (iii) Robust standard errors in brackets. 
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